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In his Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law, Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky identifies a notable attribute of federalism: it empowers
"multiple levels of government to deal with social problems."' I will
elaborate briefly on his empowerment principle by identifying compatible language in several Supreme Court opinions authored by Justice
O'Connor, suggesting that empowerment underlies the other values
traditionally ascribed to federalism, and arguing that Professor
Chemerinsky's vision of empowerment supports the Supreme Court's
recent decision in New York v. United States? Empowerment is a facet
of the autonomy model of federalism endorsed by the Court in New
York3 and propounded by several constitutional scholars.4 Professor

* John Deaver Drinko/Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University. I
thank James Brudney and Andrew Merritt for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
commentary.
1.Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 1, 40 (1995).
2. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Professor Chemerinsky ably contrasts the Supreme Court's
frequent use of federalism as a limit on federal judicial power with its rare invocation of
federalism as a limit on federal legislative power. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at pt. I.
Lacking his versatility (and ability to teach both Constitutional Law and Federal Courts during
the same semester), I will confine my comments to conflicts between state and federal exercises
of legislative power.
3. See Deborah J. Merritt, Three Facesof Federalism:Finding a Formulafor the Future,

47 VAND. L. REV. 1572-73 (1994) (explaining how the Supreme Court in New York v. United
States endorsed the autonomy model of federalism).
4. For a discussion of the autonomy model, contrasting it with two other models of
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Chemerinsky enhances that autonomy model, however, by stressing the
importance of federalism in preserving "the availability of alternative
actors to solve important problems."5
I. THE ROOTS OF EMPOWERMENT
Professor Chemerinsky accurately observes that the Supreme Court
frequently professes a commitment to federalism without articulating the
values that commitment serves. 6 Members of the Court, however, have
not entirely ignored the possibility of empowering multiple government
units as an object bf federalism. Intimations of the empowerment
rationale occur as early as 1869, when the Court announced that
the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their
governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the
maintenance of the National government. The Constitution,
in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union,
composed of indestructible States.7
Although the Court did not explicitly acknowledge the power of these
governmental units to address different social problems, it was confederalism, see id. (arguing that while the autonomy model "holds some promise for adjudicating
the future bounds of state and federal power," the territorial and federal process models are
"outdated or incompatible with political reality").
Other scholarly works developing the autonomy model, or registering at least partial support
for that model, include Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1994);
Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Lewis B. Kaden,
Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979);
Deborah J.Merritt, The GuaranteeClause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw,
79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV.
1957 (1993); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341; Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy,
86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977). For two recent critiques of the autonomy model from different
perspectives, see Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement FederalLaw?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995); Anne
C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (1995).
5. Chemerinsky, supra note 1,at 40.
6. Id. at 3-4, 26.
7. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869); see also Lane County v. Oregon,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869) (stating that the Constitution recognizes a "separate and
independent existence" for both state and federal governments which" 'are, in fact, but different
agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers and designated for different
purposes' ") (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
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cerned with maintaining multiple centers of power as an essential
constitutional object.
Justice O'Connor offered a more complete exposition of the
empowerment principle in her 1982 partial dissent in FERC v. Mississippi.' The statute challenged in FERC set the rulemaking agenda of state
utility commissions by directing them to debate a dozen federally drawn
regulations.9 Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist, repeatedly objected to this "conscription of state
legislative power""0 and interference with the states' "power to choose
subjects for legislation."11
Justice O'Connor explained that the federal attempt to control state
rulemaking violated principles of federalism because it "drain[ed] the
inventive energy of state governmental bodies."12 If state legislatures
and administrative agencies must perform "congressionally mandated
tasks," Justice O'Connor reasoned, then they "are less able to pursue
local proposals."' 3 Direct preemption of state law was preferable to
federal orchestration of state rulemaking: preemption, "at least, would
leave [the states] free to exercise their power in other areas."14 Allowing the states to "devote their resources elsewhere" would be beneficial
because "[t]his country does not lack for problems demanding legislative
attention."15
Justice O'Connor thus identified congressional interference with state
power to address social issues as a primary evil in FERC and noted that
this interference reduced the combined ability of state and federal
governments to cope with "problems demanding legislative attention." 6
Justice O'Connor also peppered her opinion with examples of progressive legislation pioneered by state governments. 7 These advances, she

8. 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
9. Id. at 776 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
10. Id. at 784 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
11. Id. at 785 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part). Justice Powell noted "the appeal-and
indeed wisdom-of Justice O'Connor's evocation of the principles of federalism," but concluded
that the Court's precedents rebuffed the facial attack on the substantive portions of the
challenged statute. Id. at 775 (Powell, J., dissenting in part). Justice Powell, therefore, limited
his partial dissent to portions of the federal act prescribing procedural rules for state
administrative agencies considering the federal standards. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting in part).
12. Id. at 787 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).

13. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
14. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
15. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
16. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
17. Justice O'Connor's examples included Wyoming's 19th century enfranchisement of
women, Wisconsin's invention of unemployment insurance, Massachusetts' initiation of
minimum wage laws, and Florida's aggressive action against oil spills. Id. at 788-89 & n.26
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implied, might not have occurred if the Constitution forced state
governments to serve as "field offices of the national bureaucracy" or
"think tanks to which Congress may assign problems for extended
study."' 8 Throughout her FERC dissent, Justice O'Connor demonstrated
her interest in maintaining separate centers of state and federal power
so that both sovereigns could pursue necessary governmental objectives.
The same recognition of empowerment as a goal of federalism
emerges in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in New York v. United
States. 9 New York struck down a portion of a federal statute that
commanded state governments either to take title to low-level radioactive waste produced in their states or to regulate those wastes as
Congress dictated." Justice O'Connor noted that this direct command
to the states was more intrusive than conditional preemption, which
allows states to choose whether to adopt a federal program,2 ' because
the latter technique allows states "to devote [their] attention and
resources to problems other than those deemed important by Congress."22 Justice O'Connor thus recognized that a significant goal of
federalism is maintaining the ability of different government levels to
address varying social problems.23
(O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
18. Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
19. 505 U.S. at 149-88. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991), also contains a passing reference to government empowerment. In
cataloguing some of the benefits of federalism, Justice O'Connor noted that federalism "makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry." Id. at
458. The concept of different sovereigns competing to offer popular social services is linked to
Professor Chemerinsky's idea of empowering different levels of government so that citizens may
rely upon multiple sovereigns to address their needs.
20. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 174-77.
21. See generally Merritt, supra note 3, at 1577 (explaining that under conditional
preemption, "Congress allows the states to choose whether to participate in a regulatory scheme.
If the states choose nonparticipation, Congress promises to assume the regulatory burden ... ").
Justice O'Connor referred to such an arrangement as" 'a program of cooperative federalism.' "
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 167 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 268 (1981)).
22. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168.
23. See also id. at 174 (upholding one portion of the challenged statute because its
conditional preemption allowed a state unwilling to follow Congress's lead to "devote its
attention and its resources to issues its citizens deem more worthy"). Justice O'Connor's opinion
for the Court in New York focused more heavily on government accountability than on
empowerment as a reason for enforcing the Constitution's federalism provisions, see id. at 16869, perhaps because the accountability rationale appeared to suit the political struggle over
locating low-level radioactive waste disposal sites. Because of the Court's own emphasis,
Professor Chemerinsky and other commentators understandably have focused on the
accountability rationale in New York. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 18-19. The empowerment rationale, however, also contributed to the Court's decision in New York.
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These references to the role of federalism in nurturing different
levels of government, each with the power to respond to citizen
demands, support Professor Chemerinsky's suggestion that federalism
is valuable because it empowers multiple units of government. By
linking Professor Chemerinsky's insight with these judicial precursors,
it may be possible to build a stronge.r jurisprudence of "empowerment"
as a rationale for federalism.2 4
II. EMPOWERMENT AND THE OTHER VALUES OF FEDERALISM

Empowerment of multiple sovereigns has intrinsic value because, as
Professor Chemerinsky observes, it creates "alternative actors to solve
important problems."' I have stressed this value in my own writing, 26
adding that "[w]ith two levels of government, the political pendulum is
less likely to swing too far towards either conservative or liberal
ideas."'2 7 An example of this tempering effect occurred during the
Reagan administration, when cities and states created teenage employment programs to fill a void left by the President's veto of an unem24. The empowerment principle also has roots in Justice Brennan's repeated suggestions
that state courts should enforce constitutional rights abandoned by the federal courts. See
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1977); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutionsas Guardiansof IndividualRights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986) [hereinafter
Brennan, The Revival of State Constitutions].See generallyRobert C. Post, Justice Brennan and

Federalism,7 CONST. COMMENTARY 227 (1990) (describing Brennan's philosophy of federalism
as an outgrowth of his concern for individual rights). Justice Brennan perceived that empowering
two judicial systems could create extra safeguards for individual rights, as state courts could
build upon minimum standards guaranteed by the federal courts. See Brennan, The Revival of
State Constitutions,supra, at 548.

25. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 40. In this section, I discuss advantages conferred by
both state and local governments. As Professor Richard Briffault has pointed out, constitutional
principles of federalism protect only states, not local governments. Richard Briffault, "What
About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in ContemporaryFederalism,47 VAND. L.

REV. 1303, 1347-48 (1994). Writers on federalism have not adequately explored the place of
local governments in our federal system. I continue to discuss some advantages conferred by
local governments because any constitutional protection for state governments may help foster
autonomous local governments as well. As Professor Briffault observes, however, states do not
necessarily encourage autonomy at the city and county level. Briffault, supra, at 1336-37. These
relationships deserve considerably more investigation.
Professor Briffault also offers an excellent discussion of how states further some of the values
traditionally linked to federalism, while local governments advance others. Id. at 1348-49. States,
for example, may be better at checking the federal government through active congressional
lobbying, while local governments may be better at drawing citizens into governmental
processes. Id.
26. See Merritt, supra note 4, at 6 (providing several examples of state initiated regulation
in the absence of action by the federal government).
27. Id. at 7.
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ployment bill.28 Similarly, several states compelled fast-food chains to
disclose their ingredients after the Food and Drug Administration
refused to compel that disclosure. 9 More recently, states grew tired of
waiting for federal reform of welfare benefits and pioneered their own
efforts-sometimes with more humane and promising prospects than the
recent congressional reforms achieved.3"
In addition to its creation of "alternative actors," empowerment is
linked to the other justifications for federalism that Professor
Chemerinsky catalogues. Indeed, as I explain briefly below, empowerment breathes new life into these rationales.
A. Checking Tyranny
The Supreme Court frequently has identified the states' role in
checking federal power as a significant value of federalism.3' As
Professor Chemerinsky points out, however, the Court rarely explains
how the states exercise this check.32 Certainly the states no longer
restrain federal action by exerting exclusive control over vast legislative
domains. Despite the Court's recent decision in United States v.
Lopez,33 the federal government has plowed furrows in every field of
modern life.
Autonomous state governments, however, still check the federal
government in at least three ways. First, the states temper the direction
of federal law by supplementing federal legislation and regulating areas
that Congress has not preempted. For example, following federal
deregulation of business in the 1980s, states strengthened their fair trade
and consumer protection laws.3 4 Similarly, states increased criminal
prosecution of workplace safety violations as federal enforcement of
OSHA slackened.35 Despite the broad scope of federal legislation,

28. Id. at 6 & n.25.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., The Role of States in Welfare Reform: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Human Resources of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
(testimony of Jane Campbell on Behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures); see
also Margo D. Butts, Urban Welfare Reform: A Community-Based Perspective, 22 FORD. URB.
L.J. 897 (1995) (stressing importance of community-based organizations in welfare reform).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1638-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181; Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458-59.
32. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 3.
33. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
34. See John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial
Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 930 (1995).
35. Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second
Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORD. L. REV. 469,
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states retain significant power to regulate private behavior interstitially
and thus to moderate the course of federal law.
Second, state and local governments are vigorous lobbyists and
litigants. States continuously press Congress to enact, modify, or repeal
legislation,36 and state lobbyists are equally vigilant before federal
administrative agencies." When states lose these legislative or administrative battles, they do not hesitate to resort to lawsuits against the
federal government.38 Because state and local governments are relatively well organized, well financed, and politically sophisticated, they are
able to shape the direction of federal programs and check the course of
congressional debate.3 9

495 (1993).
36. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1552-53
(1994); Merritt, supra note 4, at 6; Harry N. Scheiber, State Law and "IndustrialPolicy" in
American Development, 1790-1987, 75 CAL. L. REv. 415, 438-39 (1987).

37. For a recent example, see The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg.
2180, 2182, 2184, 2185 (1995) (reporting comments on rules implementing the Family and
Medical Leave Act; along with other government units and associations, participants included
the Association of Washington Cities, the California Department of Fair Employment and
Housing, the State of Nevada personnel department, the State of Louisiana's Office of
Legislative Auditor, the Government Finance Officers Association, the State of Kansas
Department of Administration, and the State of New York Metropolitan Transportation
Authority).
38. During the 1980s, for example, some states and cities defended affirmative action
programs challenged by the federal government. See Merritt, supra note 4, at 5. States also have
cooperated with social security beneficiaries to sue the federal government for benefits denied
the physically and mentally impaired. Id. at 5-6. More recently, several states have sued the
federal government to force more stringent enforcement of the country's immigration laws. See,
e.g., Tony Perry, State's Immigration Suit Dismissed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995, at A3

(reporting that in dismissing California's lawsuit, the court found "no legal precedent for a state
suing the federal government for failing to enforce immigration laws"); Ross Ramsey, Judge
Throws Out Immigration Lawsuit, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 10, 1995, at A21 (reporting that in
addition to the lawsuits brought by Texas, California, and Florida, all of which have been
dismissed, New York, New Jersey, and Arizona also have filed suits).
39. Some scholars point to the fact that state governments are able to influence the
direction of federal programs as evidence that the political process adequately protects all state
interests in the federal/state balance. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171-259 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguardsof
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National

Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). The Supreme Court accepted this claim in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-54 (1985). As I argue below, however,
completely abandoning judicial enforcement of federalism principles is misguided. The courts
retain an important role in policing some techniques of congressional regulation that pose serious
threats to state autonomy or "empowerment." See infra text accompanying notes 66-77; see also
Merritt, supra note 4; Deborah J. Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A
New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815 (1994).
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Third, state and local governments serve as wellsprings of political
power. Political parties that lack federal clout maintain their constituencies in the states. When the time is ripe, those state organizations
provide a platform for challenging the dominant national party.' ° State
and local politics also provide spawning grounds for the coalescence of
new interest groups. After organizing locally, these groups may acquire
sufficient power to sway national decisions. In these ways, the
ferment of state and local politics may check the growth of monolithic
political power at the national level.
All three of these control mechanisms require healthy state governments that are "empowered" to address real social issues. Without the
power to legislate, interest groups would not form in the states, political
parties would be unable to build state constituencies, and states could
not alter the contours of federal programs by regulating interstitially. 2
Professor Chemerinsky's identification of empowerment as a prime
value of federalism thus illuminates the Court's traditional view of states
exercising a political check on federal power.
B. Responsiveness
The Supreme Court also has praised state governments as more
responsive than Congress to the needs of local citizens.43 This value of
federalism includes two related, but different, benefits. 44 First, the
Court has suggested that states are smaller, more homogenous units than
our nation, allowing state governments to pursue programs that are
better tailored to the distinctive preferences of their citizens.45 Second,
the relative accessibility of state and local government encourages
citizens to participate in the governmental process, teaching the lessons
of self rule.46
40. See Arthur W. Macmahon, The Problems of Federalism:A Survey, in FEDERALISM:
MATURE AND EMERGENT 3, 11 (Arthur W. Macmahon ed., 1955) ("[F]ederalism lessens the risk
of a monopoly of political power by providing a number of independent points where the party
that is nationally in the minority at the time can maintain itself while it formulates and partly
demonstrates its policies and capabilities and develops new leadership.").
41. See Akhil R. Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
483, 504 (1991); Rapaczynski, supra note 4, at 387-88.
42. See Powell, supra note 4, at 686 (" 'Without [the power to develop, consider, adopt,
and implement policies that regulate and structure private-sector activities], local government
could hardly affect any private activity,' and (we might add) can be of little interest except as
a sort of debating society for those with free time.") (quoting GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND
THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL AUTONOMY 68 (1985)).
43. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.; FERC, 456 U.S. at 789-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Professor Chemerinsky raises valid questions about both of these
rationales. Is the state of California really more homogenous than the
nation as a whole?4' 7 And does the city of Los Angeles offer its citizens
a cozy experience in self government?4 These are important points to
consider before extolling the values of a federal system.
Once again, though, the principle of empowerment demonstrates the
federalism value of responsiveness. As a practical matter, and despite
the bewildering heterogeneity marking the population of every state,
state governments have created diverse political climates. For example,
some states stress environmental protection, while others proclaim the
"right to profit. ' 49 The governor of California has denounced affirmative action, while the governor of Ohio applauds it."° These differences
indicate that majority interests shift from state to state, and that local
politicians respond to those differences.
Equally important, these variations in legal culture-undergirded by
a strong system of uniform national law-respond to the needs of a
diverse population better than a fully centralized system would. Our
federal system resolves certain issues on the national level while leaving
others for state and local action. Minority interests in each state may
lose to the local majority on the latter issues, but they always have the
option of seeking a better life elsewhere." Federalism, in other words,
responds to voter preferences both by allowing states to tailor laws to
the preferences of the local majority and by creating some choice of
legal systems for all citizens. 2
47. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 29.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practiceof Federalism Underthe Clean Air Act, 54 MD.
L. REv. 1183, 1223 (1995) (noting that many state governments are active in formulating
environmental policy); Harry N. Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power:
Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 619, 621 (1978) (noting that
Louisiana advertised itself as the "Right-to-Profit State").
50. Robert Shogan, Affirmative Action Stirs Unforeseen Division in GOP, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1995, at Al, A17. See generally Kaden, supra note 4, at 854 (discussing other
"differences in the political choices" made from state to state).
51. See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 4, at 1877-80 (stressing the importance of state law in
providing choices for individuals seeking different laws governing family relations); Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1503
(1987) (book review) (noting "the migration of homosexuals to cities like San Francisco, where
they received official toleration, and the migration of individuals from Massachusetts to New
Hampshire to escape high rates of taxation"); cf. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (federalism "makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry").
52. As Professors Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have pointed out, these two aspects
of responsiveness correspond to the notions of voice and exit: "Individuals will seek
organizations that are responsive to their needs, or voice; if their present organization fails to
respond, they can exercise their exit option to locate a more responsive one.' Edward L. Rubin
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Professor Chemerinsky's focus on empowerment also reminds us of
the different ways in which state and local governments draw citizens
into the governing process. It is true that voters participate in state and
local elections at appallingly low rates; in this sense, state politics
fosters less participation than national elections. Nevertheless, those
citizens who vote in a school board election may feel that they
understand the issues better, enjoy a clearer choice among candidates,
and have a greater likelihood of affecting the election's outcome than
they do when casting a vote for one of two or three Presidential
candidates. Simple counts of electoral participation fail to assess the
quality of the voter's experience. 3
State and local governments also offer thousands of political offices
that would not exist in a centralized government. In that sense,
federalism vastly multiplies opportunities for political participation.
These governments, moreover, have proven particularly adept at drawing
women, minorities, and other political outsiders into government
positions. Even today, women's voices are much stronger in state
legislatures than in Congress. In 1993, women accounted for one-fifth
of all state legislators, but less than one-tenth of U.S. Representatives
and one-twentieth of U.S. Senators. 4 Similarly, African-Americans
have been much more successful in winning state and local offices than
national ones." Empowering state governments appears to empower
political outsiders as well, giving them local opportunities to gain
entrance to politics. This may be one of the most significant contributions of a federal system.
C. Experimentation
Almost every discussion of federalism invokes Justice Brandeis's
famous description of the states as "laborator[ies]" that "try novel social

& Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903,
917 (1994). Federalism, of course, cannot create an unrestrained political marketplace. National
laws remove many options from state control, and significant relocation costs prevent citizens
from migrating in response to every disagreement with state law. The additional responsiveness
contributed by federalism, however, remains an advantage of the system.
53. Even if state and local governments currently fall short of the ideal of political
participation, those units also may hold more hope of reviving civic republicanism. See, e.g., S.
Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologiesand Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 68788, 765-66 (1991) (cautioning against the continuation of a trend favoring federal preemption
of state and local law).
54. Laura Mecoy, State Offers Highest Hopes for Year of the Woman, Part II,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 9, 1993, at Al.
55. See Merritt, supra note 4, at 8.
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and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."56
Some commentators have interpreted Justice Brandeis's exhortation
literally, as suggesting that federalism will promote controlled, social
science experiments." As Professors Edward Rubin and Malcolm
Feeley have pointed out, a centralized government is more likely than
autonomous states to pursue controlled experiments of this nature."
Despite his pseudo-scientific language, it is doubtful that Justice
Brandeis expected states to engage in controlled social experiments.
Instead, experimentation in a federal system is akin to natural selection.59 States adopt novel programs either to satisfy local interests or
in a conscious attempt to attract new residents.60 If the programs satisfy
their constituents, the programs flourish and may spread to other states.
If the programs disappoint voters, they disappear. This type of experimentation lies behind much of the legislation filling both state and
federal codes. 1
Experimentation of this nature is firmly linked to Chemerinsky's
view of federalism as empowerment. Authorizing multiple government
units to address social problems increases the opportunities for
experimental programs to emerge. Even the boldest national department
of social policy research could not generate the hundreds of legislative

56. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
57. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 52, at 923-26.
58. Id. at 924-26; but see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does
FederalismPromote Innovation?,9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980) (arguing from theoretical model
that neither a centralized government, autonomous states, nor a federal system provide strong
incentives for experimentation on the state or local level).
59. For an excellent development of this point, see McConnell, supra note 51, at 1498500.
60. See id.
61. Once again, states must develop new programs within any constraints imposed by
federal law. Perhaps due to the infinite variability of human conduct, however, states continue
to innovate in a remarkable number of fields. It is also noteworthy how many federal schemes
incorporate earlier state innovations. See, e.g., FERC, 456 U.S. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting in part) (noting state innovations already adopted at the federal level, such as
minimum wage laws and the enfranchisement of women, as well as ongoing state innovations
in such wide-ranging areas as automobile insurance, environmental protection, and utility
regulation); Drummonds, supranote 35, at 496-97,500,502-03 (describing federal incorporation
of state innovations in regulating sexual harassment, family leave, and disabilities discrimination); Dwyer, supra note 49, at 1222 n.189 ("Even in the 1960s, some state and local
governments were leading, not following, the federal government toward greater environmental
protection."); Kaden, supra note 4, at 854-55 (describing federal programs in a wide variety of
fields, all of which originated in the states); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism:
HistoricalRoots and ContemporaryModels, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1172 (1995) (noting that
"[s]ome of the most innovative environmental protection legislation has been the product of state
initiatives").
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proposals adopted by state, county, and city governments each year.
Some of those initiatives may be silly and some may be awful, but some
hold real promise for social progress. In all, this vast marketplace of
political ideas-stocked by one national government, fifty state
governments, and thousands of local authorities--offers an important
resource for devising worthwhile social programs.
These values of federalism-empowerment, political control,
responsiveness (through both diversity and political engagement), and
experimentation-argue in favor of retaining a role for autonomous state
governments in our maturing democracy. None of these arguments,
though, suggest that we should return all power to the states. As
Professor Chemerinsky stresses, federalism is a system in which both
the national and state governments play important roles.62 Indeed, the
values of federalism depend on the continued existence of both levels
of government. The states check the aggregation of monolithic power in
the national government, while the national government checks
oppression by local majorities in the states. State governments offer
diverse living conditions, while the national government insures that
citizens can move freely from state to state. State and local governments
offer multiple opportunities for political participation, but the national
government insures that participation remains open to all. And, at least
in some fields, state innovation increases after the national government
establishes minimum standards.63 In all of these ways, federalism
depends upon the empowerment of many governments, not just one.
III.

EMPOWERMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

Empowering multiple sovereigns, as federalism requires, is a difficult
task. Professor Chemerinsky resolves this problem by suggesting that,
because federalism strives to empower all levels of government,
"federalism generally should not be the basis for invalidating federal
laws."' Instead, "[a]ll levels of government should be available to deal
with the complex and difficult social problems facing the United States
as it enters the next millenia."65 However, the empowerment principle
does not support a simple rule favoring enforcement of federal law. The
Constitution already assigns the federal government the trump card in
any direct contest between state and federal law; under the Supremacy
Clause, federal law must prevail. Using the empowerment principle to
62. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at passim.
63. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 49, at 1223-24 (describing how federal environmental
legislation spurred a dramatic growth in state environmental regulation).
64. Chemerinsky, supra note I, at 41.
65. Id.
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urge further deference t9 Congress would allow the federal government
to overpower, rather than empower, the states.
Instead, the empowerment principle prescribes modest limits on
federal power similar to constraints urged by scholars who advocate the
autonomy model of federalism.66 As Professor Chemerinsky urges,
Congress must have broad scope to decide which substantive problems
to address nationally and which ones to relegate to the states. 67
Congress has more information and better fact-gathering resources than
the courts to resolve these questions. A preference for national or local
solutions in particular areas also may vary over time. During an earlier
era, we left family law largely to the states, allowing both experimentation and diversity in those laws. With increased population mobility, and
a crisis of poverty among single women and their children, we have
chosen to impose some national measures regarding child support."
Except at the margins, the Constitution should grant
the federal
69
government the power to act when it deems necessary.
In New York v. United States, however, the Supreme Court recognized that the manner in which Congress regulates can affect state
power as much as the substance of the legislation. 0 Whenever
Congress enacts legislation, it "disempowers" states from adopting
contrary rules. That is the necessary price of the Supremacy Clause; we
cannot empower two levels of government without offering some rule

66. See supra note 4.
67. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 38-39.

68. See Dailey, supra note 4, at 1885 (discussing the Child Support Enforcement Act and
arguing that, although the states should retain primary control of family law, some federal
legislation is necessary to reinforce state authority).
69. See Kramer, supra note 36, at 1500-01 (stating that "courts are poorly situated to make
(or second guess) the difficult judgments about where power should be settled or when it can
be shifted advantageously"). Congress possesses only the powers delegated to it, rather than a
general police power. In theory, therefore, Congress may lack authority to assign some subjects
to its control. The Supreme Court's expansive construction of the commerce and spending
clauses, however, leaves Congress virtually unfettered discretion to decide whether matters
should be handled at the state or federal level. Even the Court's recent decision in United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), represents only a minor restraint on congressional power. In
Lopez, the Court struck down Congress's attempt to regulate the possession of guns within 1000
feet of schools. See id. at 1626. The decision, however, stemmed from the Court's exasperation
with both Congress's blatant disregard for any limits on its power and the Solicitor General's
unrestrained arguments justifying the statute. See Deborah J. Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 674, 686-89, 696-98 (1995). Congress may be able to regulate gun possession near schools
with a slightly different statute. Id. at 696-98. After Lopez, Congress may have to take its
delegated powers more seriously, but the decision is unlikely to impose significant limits on the
subjects Congress assigns to federal control.
70. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168.
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for mediating differences between them and we recognize the need for
national control in many areas.
Despite displacing contrary state laws, however, most congressional
regulations leave states with significant power. Direct preemption of
state law allows states "to devote [their] attention and resources to
problems other than those deemed important by Congress" and even "to
supplement [the federal] program to the extent state law is not preempted." 7 ' Conditional preemption and spending programs similarly allow the
states to choose whether to pursue federal ends or follow an alternate
course. Even when states perceive that refusing federal funds is not a
realistic option, their formal power to reject federal programs may
enhance their voices in both pre-passage lobbying and program
administration. 72 These traditional techniques of federal regulation, in
other words, are consistent with Professor Chemerinsky's vision of
empowering multiple government levels.
On the other hand, Congress's recent ploy of issuing direct commands to the states exacts an additional price from the purse of state
power. In addition to denying the states authority to regulate a substantive area, a federal law that "harness[es] state power for national
purposes" will absorb the energy of state legislators and prevent them
from applying their creativity to other problems. 73 For this reason, the
Supreme Court held in New York that "[t]he Federal Government may
not compel
the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
74
program.,
Professor Chemerinsky's empowerment principle lends important
support to this result. A single federal command to the states might not
significantly diminish state power, but the cumulative effect of many
commands would reduce the states to "regional offices [or] administrative agencies of the Federal Government., 75 This prospect of fifty
regional offices, each dependent upon the federal government for
direction, is far different from the vigorous picture Professor

71. Id.
72. See Kramer, supra note 36, at 1542-44 (asserting that the states are assured a voice
in the lawmaking and administrative processes because the "federal government needs the states
as much as the reverse"); see also Dwyer, supra note 49, at 1216-19 (stating that Congress and
federal administrative officials must consider state interests under the Clean Air Act in order to
win state cooperation in implementing the Act).
73. FERC, 456 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part); see also New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. at 168, 174 ("A State whose citizens do not wish it to attain the Act's
milestones may devote its attention and its resources to issues its citizens deem more
worthy ...").
74. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 188.
75. Id.
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Chemerinsky paints of "empowering multiple levels of government to
deal with social problems."76 In politics, as in management theory,
empowerment requires some measure of autonomy to produce results."
IV. CONCLUSION
The last five years have witnessed a remarkable resurgence of
judicial, legislative, and scholarly attention to federalism. Professor
Chemerinsky reminds us that we cannot intelligently continue the
current debate over the future of federalism without careful exploration
of the values of our federal system. By raising that question, and
proposing empowerment as a significant benefit of multiple sovereigns,
Professor Chemerinsky adds an essential perspective to the ongoing
dialogue.

76. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 40.
77. See THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE
200-34 (1982); Merritt, supra note 3, at 1575 & n.49; Powell, supra note 4, at 686-87.
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